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Stephanie A. George 
 
Upending decades of common practice in water management and 
building in the state of Washington, the Washington Supreme Court 
found Whatcom County violated the state’s Growth Management Act. 
Whatcom County used the Department of Ecology’s Nooksack Rule in 
evaluating permits for buildings and subdivisions that rely on permit-
exempt wells. This decision affects families across the state of 
Washington. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Seeking to cure ailments in its land use regulations, Whatcom 
County (“County”) revised its comprehensive land use plan to conform 
with Washington’s Growth Management Act (“GMA”).1 Insufficiencies 
in the County’s water availability and water quality regulations led it to 
adopt the Department of Ecology’s (“Ecology”) Nooksack Rule.2 The 
County used the rule to determine water availability when evaluating 
building permit applications relying on permit-exempt wells.3 County 
residents challenged this, arguing this method of permitting did not 
adequately protect surface and groundwater resources.4 The Washington 
Growth Management Board (“Board”) agreed and concluded that 
Whatcom County failed to comply with the GMA.  The Washington 
Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the County’s plan did comply 
with the GMA.5 The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals, holding that the County could not rely on the Ecology’s 
Nooksack Rule to determine water availability.6 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1997, the County adopted a comprehensive land use plan and 
development regulations that complied with the original language of the 
GMA. The regulations provided: “The rural element [of a comprehensive 
plan] shall permit land uses that are compatible with the rural character of 
such lands and provide for a variety of rural densities.”7 However, two 
months after the plan’s adoption, the GMA was amended, giving rise to a 
series of challenges to the County’s comprehensive plan.8 The Board heard 
                                                     
1.         Whatcom Cnty. v. Hirst, 381 P.3d 1, 4 (Wash. 2016). 
2.         Id. 
3.         Id. 
4.         Id. at 4–5. 
5.         Id. at 6. 
6.         Id. at 7. 
7.  Gold Star Resorts, Inc. v. Futurewise, 222 P.3d 791, 793 (Wash. 
2009).  
8.  Id. 
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the challenges and directed the County to revise its comprehensive plan to 
conform with the 1997 amendments. The Washington Supreme Court 
upheld the Board’s order.9  
In response, the County amended its comprehensive plan and 
zoning code.10 It adopted Ecology’s regulations regarding water 
availability to comply with the GMA requirement that counties include 
measures to protect surface and groundwater availability and quality in 
their comprehensive land use plans.11 These regulations allowed “[A] 
subdivision or building permit applicant to rely on a private well only 
when the well site proposed by the applicant does not fall within the 
boundaries of an area where Ecology has determined by rule that water for 
development does not exist.”12  This regulation, adopted in 1985, is known 
as the Nooksack Rule. It established minimum instream flows for water 
resource inventory area 1 (“WRIA 1”), which covers most of the County.13  
 Petitioners challenged the ordinance’s adequacy to protect surface 
and groundwater resources and sought a declaration of invalidity.14 The 
Board interpreted the GMA’s planning requirements and goals to specify 
that “a County’s Comprehensive Plan rural lands provision must include 
measures governing rural development to protect water resources.”15 This 
included protections of “instream flows, groundwater recharge, and fish 
and wildlife habitat.”16 Petitioners argued that the County’s 
comprehensive plan failed to protect instream flows because the plan did 
not require the County to determine whether water was legally available 
before issuing building permits for structures relying on permit exempt 
wells.17 The County argued that its comprehensive plan did protect 
instream flows because it followed the Nooksack Rule, only approving 
building permits that relied on permit-exempt wells when they did not fall 
within an area that “[Ecology had] determined that water for development 
did not exist.”18 
The Board concluded that the County failed to comply with the 
GMA’s requirement to protect surface and groundwater resources.19 It 
determined that the County’s comprehensive plan did not protect water 
availability or water quality.20 It remanded the ordinance to the County to 
revise.21 Both parties appealed. The County challenged the Board’s 
determination of noncompliance with the GMA, and Petitioners 
                                                     
9.  Whatcom Cnty., 381 P.3d at 4.  
10.  Id.  
11. Id. 
12.  Id. (citing Chapter 173-501 WAC) 
13.  Id. at 7. 
14.  Id. at 4–5. 
15.  Id. at 5. 
16.  Id.  
17.  Id. at 7.  
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. at 6.  
 20. Id.  
21.  Id.  
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challenged the Board’s decision to not declare the ordinance invalid.22 The 
Court of Appeals reversed the Board, holding that the County’s ordinance 
did comply with the GMA, and affirmed the Board’s decision not to 
declare the ordinance invalid.23 The Washington Supreme Court granted 
review.24  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  The County Failed to Comply with the GMA’s Requirement to Protect 
Water Availability 
 
The Court concluded that the County’s comprehensive plan 
violated the GMA and failed to protect the availability of surface and 
groundwater resources, because it allowed permit-exempt appropriations 
to inhibit minimum flows.25 Minimum flows are “flows or levels to protect 
instream flows necessary for fish and other wildlife, recreation and 
aesthetic purposes, and water quality.”26 Withdrawals exempt from permit 
requirements include any withdrawal that does not exceed 5,000 gallons a 
day.27 Established in 1945, this encouraged the development and 
settlement of family farms that drew between 200 and 1,500 gallons of 
water per day.28 The legislature enacted the GMA in 1991 to address 
growing concerns about rapid growth and development across the state 
and its impact on minimum flows.29 Because the GMA requires counties 
to “protect the rural character of the area” through their land use planning, 
the Court concluded that the GMA required the County to make 
determinations of water availability before issuing permits.30 
Furthermore, the Court held that the plain language of the GMA 
explicitly placed the burden on the counties, not Ecology, to address water 
availability in land use planning.31 The County’s comprehensive plan did 
not require a showing of water availability when the building permit 
applicant relied on a permit-exempt water appropriation, but instead relied 
on Ecology’s Nooksack Rule to determine availability.32 The Court 
concluded that the County erred in doing this because the GMA placed the 
burden on counties to ensure water is legally and actually available before 
issuing building permits.33  
                                                     
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 7. 
25. Id. at 8-9.  
26. Id. (quoting Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Washington State 
Dep’t. of Ecology, 311 P.3d 6, 16 (Wash. 2013). 
27. Whatcom Cnty., 381 P.3d at 9. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 10. 
30. Id. at 11. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 12. 
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Additionally, the Court held that the County failed to comply with 
the GMA and protect the availability of water resources by using 
Ecology’s Nooksack Rule.34 According to Ecology, the Nooksack Rule 
presumes water availability “based on the scientific understanding [in 
1985, when] Ecology determined that only limited instances would occur 
in which groundwater withdrawals might impair instream flows.”35 This 
understanding evolved over time with the advancement of science. The 
Board found that as early as 1999, the County had recognized that permit 
exempt wells were creating “‘difficulties for effective water resource 
management.’”36 By relying on the Nooksack Rule, the County 
contradicted the GMA’s requirement that counties protect water resources 
by determining that water was legally and actually available before issuing 
permits.37 
The Court further found that the County’s plan was inconsistent 
with past decisions protecting basins and minimum flows from 
groundwater appropriations.38 In past decisions, the Court held that a 
permit-exempt well may not infringe on an earlier established right to 
water, which included minimum flows.39 Once Ecology established a 
minimum flow, it was considered an existing water right that may not be 
compromised by later water withdrawals.40 Therefore, if a building permit 
relying on a permit-exempt well impaired a minimum instream flow, it 
must be denied.41 By relying on the Nooksack Rule in evaluating building 
permits, the County did not review each permit application for impairment 
of existing rights, so it did not comply with the Court’s past decisions.42  
 
B.  The County Failed to Comply with the GMA’s Requirement to Protect 
Water Quality. 
 
The Court interpreted the GMA to require counties to protect the 
quality of the water used for public purposes.43 The goal of the GMA is to 
“protect the environment and enhance the state’s high quality of life, 
including air and water quality.”44 Petitioners argued that this means the 
County must not only protect water quality, but must also enhance the 
quality of the water through their comprehensive plans.45 However, the 
                                                     
34. Id. at 14. 
35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 6. (quoting EX. C—671—D at 49 (1999 Whatcom County 
Water Resource Plan)). 
37. Id. at 16. 
38. Id. at 16. 
39. Id. at 16. 
40. Id. at 17. 
41. Id. at 17. 
42. Id. at 18. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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Court saw nothing in the language of the statute imposing a duty on 
counties to enhance water, though it did require counties to protect it.46 
The Court found that the Board was correct in its determination 
that the County’s policies did not adequately protect water quality.47 The 
Board found that the County’s plan did not contain any measures to limit 
development for protection of water resources.48 The County’s plan also 
did not ensure that land use and development patterns were consistent with 
surface and groundwater protection throughout its rural area.49 Therefore, 
the Court found that the County’s plan violated its duty under the GMA to 
protect water resources.50 The Court also held that the Board did not abuse 
its discretion in declining to make a determination of invalidity regarding 
the County’s plan.51 
 
IV.  DISSENT 
 
Justice Stephens dissented from the majority’s holding. He 
disagreed with the majority’s assumption that by requiring counties to 
determine water availability before granting building permits, the GMA 
prohibits counties from relying on Ecology’s determination of water 
availability for withdrawal.52 The dissent argued that this holding will 
require individual building permit applicants to commission 
hydrogeological studies to determine the impact of their very small 
withdrawal on senior water rights.53 Then, the local building department 
would have to evaluate the sufficiency of the studies.54 Justice Stephens 
argued that the practical result of this would be to impose impossible 
burdens on landowners, potentially put counties at odds with Ecology, and 
stop counties from granting building permits that rely on permit-exempt 
wells.55 According to the dissent, this is not what the legislature intended 
when it enacted the GMA.56 
RCW 19.27.097, part of the GMA, provides in part that “each 
applicant for a building permit of a building necessitating potable water 
shall provide evidence of an adequate water supply for the intended use of 
the building.”57 According to Justice Stephens, the use of the term 
“adequate” instead of “available” was important. The dissent reasoned that 
this meant applicants were not required to show that water was legally 
                                                     
46. Id. at 19. 
47. Id. at 20. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 22. 
52. Id. at 24 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
53. Id. 
54. Id.  
55. Id.  
56. Id. 
57. Id.  
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available, just that it was there.58 Therefore, by deferring to Ecology’s 
determination of water availability, the County’s comprehensive plan was 
not in violation of the GMA.59 
The dissent commented that allowing counties to rely on 
Ecology’s water determinations would promote the “integrated, 
comprehensive management the legislature envisioned.”60 Additionally, it 
would promote consistency in water management and protection 
throughout a basin.61  Basins can cross county lines, and allowing counties 
to rely on one overarching determination promotes consistency.62 
According to the dissent, the majority’s holding would require each county 
to determine their own approach to permit applications, and this county-
by-county approach would perpetuate the tragedy of fragmentation in 
resource management.63 The dissent contended that counties lack 
Ecology’s expertise and statewide perspective, and are not adequately 
equipped to thoroughly vet information provided by permit applicants.64 
Therefore, according to the dissent, prohibiting counties from relying on 
Ecology’s water determinations would only further harm water resources. 
Thus, counties should be allowed to rely on Ecology’s Nooksack Rule 
when granting building permits that rely on permit-exempt wells.65 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Washington Supreme Court invalidated the County’s 
comprehensive land use plan because by relying on Ecology’s Nooksack 
Rule when granting building permits that rely on permit-exempt wells, it 
violated GMA protections of minimum flows. This holding imposed a 
duty on Washington counties to determine not only the availability of 
water, but also the water’s legal availability for each building permit 
applicant who relies on a permit-exempt well. This decision will cause a 
county-by-county approach to water management in the state, and cause 
counties to rely on their own expertise and resources in evaluating permit 
applications, which may impact their ability to approve applications. This 
decision will have a great impact on water management and Washington 
landowners, but, as the majority hopes, may help to protect water 
resources within the state. 
                                                     
58. Id. at 25.  
59. Id.  
60. Id. at 27.  
61. Id.  
62. Id.  
63. Id.  
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 31.  
